Improving the National Strategy Process
While the world is changing, and as its interactions pick up speed thanks to the spreading implications of the information revolution, most of the component parts of the U.S. national security system, still organized hierarchically around traditional organizational disciplines, grow more ponderous and reactive.
-James Locher 1 The existing United States national strategy process is in dire need of improvement. A national strategy which is not directed at achieving specific national objectives or which is not resourced to do so lacks utility. The current strategic direction processes fail to provide the desired ends with the ways and means to achieve them. 2 Identifying national ends and resources will still fail to provide satisfactory results if they are not properly planned, coordinated, and executed by the interagency process. The current system needs to be improved through legislation and Presidential Directive.
These improvements will ensure that all elements of the DIME work cooperatively to achieve national interests, that they are adequately resourced and organized to do so through the budgeting process, and will provide for periodic progress reviews in order to make course corrections or adjustments.
The Current Situation and Critique "The National Security Act of 1947, subsequent amendments, the GoldwaterNichols Act of 1986, Congressional rules, and a host of Presidential, Department and Agency directives created the current national security organizations and structures." 3 With America increasingly involved in global affairs following World War II, the role of the various executive departments and their relationship to one another became more and more entangled. As Karl Inderfuth and Loch Johnson noted, "Problems of assimilation clearly have multiplied as governments pursue more and more complex, frequently conflicting objectives." 4 The multiple committees and advisory groups formed during the war were first brought into a formalized plan for civil-military coordination in the National Security Act of 1947, which established the National Security Council (NSC), provided a secretary of defense, and linked the three services with joint committees under the service chiefs. In 1949 the system was amended to consolidate authority under the secretary of defense and provide a chairman for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
In 1986 the Department of Defense Reorganization Act (known as the Goldwater-Nichols Act) addressed several key features intended to promote joint cooperation among the services. The act also mandated the production of strategy documents that were to be used by the executive and legislative branches. James
Miskel recognized that, "The national security strategy statements . . . were to identify national interests and the strategies being pursued to achieve them, and that both classified and unclassified reports were to be published." 5 According to the Congressional Research Service, "The core national security strategic documents today are the national security strategy, the national defense strategy together with the Quadrennial Defense Review report, and the national military strategy." 6 In addition to these mandated documents there exists a host of other "strategies" produced by various agencies and addressing topics as diverse as money laundering, strategic communication, and pandemic influenza.
The Goldwater-Nichols Act systematically changed the roles and authorities of the existing military institutions, while developing incentives and disincentives to alter how the military acts and operates, in addition to tying the military instrument of power to an articulated and agreed upon strategy. Consequently, many of those espousing changes to our current national strategy process have turned to the Goldwater-Nichols Act as a blueprint for what right looks like.
Michele Flournoy is one of those calling for change. Writing with various groups and authors such as Shawn Brimley, Flournoy has identified several issues which call for action. 7 Flournoy believes that the current strategy planning process focuses on issues already on the policy agenda, rather than future challenges. Nor does our current process address the types of capabilities needed in the future. All of this is exacerbated by a budgeting process which is not tied to strategic ends. Flournoy argues for an inclusive and integrated process for long term strategic planning in the executive branch modeled after President Eisenhower's Solarium Project. 8 She also
advocates the creation of an NSC Senior Director, an Office for Strategic Planning, and a classified National Security Planning Guidance. She recommends improving interagency understanding and cooperation through an annual table-top exercise program for senior national security officials and joint NSC-Office of Management and Budget (OMB) mission area reviews.
James Locher is another advocate for changing our current system. Locher has been intimately involved in studying the interagency and strategy development process, including participation in several of the Beyond Goldwater-Nichols studies. He advocates new approaches focused on missions and outcomes, such as linking resources to goals through mission analysis and mission budgeting. Locher's approach emphasizes organizational restructuring. 9 This includes the establishment of a President's Security Council to replace the NSC and Homeland Security Council (HSC) and the creation of interagency teams and interagency crisis task forces to decentralize policy implementation. All of these recommendations are designed to improve the executive-legislative relationship while focusing the executive office on strategy and strategic management.
Given the current state of affairs and the critique of our present system, there can be no doubt that our national strategy process can be improved. Realizing that the press of daily challenges prevents any attempt at wholesale change, this paper will analyze those issues which can be modified and improved within the current system.
This includes nesting of department strategies and ways to ensure that all elements of the DIME work cooperatively to achieve national interests, that these strategies are adequately resourced and organized through the budgeting process in conjunction with
Congress, and provides for periodic intelligence and progress reviews in order to make course corrections or adjustments.
Analysis of the Issues

Nesting
The National Security Strategy (NSS) is our current overarching strategy which guides the development of the interagency supporting strategies. These supporting strategies then guide the actions of the agencies in achieving our strategic ends. But the current NSS is a vague document with broad themes, written for public consumption, without the specificity required for positive action. Statesmen, security professionals, and academics all agree that strategy and foreign policy is best made when the national interests are clearly defined and articulated. 10 Our current process fails to properly identify long term strategic interests, assign responsibility for their But simply identifying the agency responsibilities is not enough. The tasks must then be coordinated during supporting strategy development and execution to prevent interagency fratricide and redundancy. Kathleen Hicks identified the problem that, "When multiple guidance documents produced by these competing systems conflict, customers, capability providers, and other stakeholders inside and outside the department are left to determine which are binding and which can be ignored." 16 The current system attempts to accomplish this through the interagency process, but the results are haphazard at best. Colin Gray identifies the top two problems faced by strategists as the enemy and a dysfunctional policymaking process at home. 17 American interagency cooperation currently works best during periods of crisis, when all efforts are focused on a single issue. This cooperation rapidly breaks down during the day to day management and gives way to beltway competition, often with detrimental results to our national interests. As Tami Davis Biddle pointed out, "Stove-piping of information, bureaucratic infighting, and organizational and cultural biases also can cause us to flounder on the shoals of ignorance, self-interest, or arrogance." 18 Our current national strategy process can be improved by ensuring we prosecute whole of government solutions to our complex challenges. In order to do so, we must identify and articulate clear, well defined strategic ends, and then assign appropriate responsibilities. We must ensure that agencies develop supporting strategies, and that 
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The intelligence community must provide strategic intelligence: long range forecasts based upon rigorous analysis and incorporating diverse elements such as the global environment and the predicted actions of other actors. Richard Immerman recommends that in contrast to current intelligence, this strategic intelligence would be ". . . That composite intelligence, interdepartmental in character, which is required . . . in determining policies with respect to national planning and security in peace and war and for the advancement of broad national policy." 23 Such a shift is required to advance intelligence production beyond the tactical and operational levels into the strategic realm where it will provide meaningful input to the interagency and strategy development 8 processes. This input would be instrumental for the president and the NSC in the production of a grand national strategy and detailed planning guidance, as well as to the various departments as they develop their nested supporting strategies.
Once the strategy has been crafted, the focus for the intelligence community then shifts to collection on those identified national interests and the effectiveness of our Community provides valuable products to policymakers on a regular basis, it has not been tasked to support a more interactive process in which future trends, possible developments, and wild cards can be discussed and debated to inform national security issues." 24 Attempting to develop and assess strategy without the appropriate intelligence is haphazard at best and disastrous at worst. In the absence of dedicated support by the intelligence community, strategists will rely on in-house assessments or think tank products, further stovepiping and confusing the interagency process, making coordinated effort all but impossible. Kathleen Hicks recognized this when she wrote that, "The next QDR should also be prefaced by a set of competitive, independent 9 analyses of the strategic environment and its implications for the U.S defense policy." 25 Occasional steps have been made in this direction, such as the National Intelligence
Council's Global Trends 2025 report, but such products are intermittent and not fully integrated into the strategy development and interagency process. No long term human endeavor can stand the test of time without periodic feedback and correction. As Kathleen Hicks points out, "An unused strategy is an irrelevant strategy." 35 Our current strategy process lacks an organized periodic review, although some may claim that the annual NSS acts as such. In reality, the NSS is currently used to broadcast administration policies and goals, with very little feedback or assessment involved. Tami Biddle recognized the need for periodic review of strategy and goals.
All parties who are necessary to the success of a grand strategy must stay in ongoing and open communication with one another, not least of all to make sure that the logic relating ends and means is not usurped or undermined by the course of events, or simply forgotten. Progress (or lack of progress) towards the aim must be monitored constantly, and adjustments made in light of setbacks or stagnation. The incongruities that exist in the organizational structure are, however, considerably eased by the subformal and informal systems . . . These subformal systems must be continually borne in mind, whenever one considers the necessity of reform. For such systems mean, first, that reform may not be as much required, as one would infer from the formal system, and, second, one must take care in any reform that one does not do damage to these useful subformal systems. 46 Congress has also begun to address the issues. Representative Ike Skelton, then Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee lamented, "For many years, we've heard that when it comes to interagency collaboration on national security, our system is inefficient, ineffective, and often down-right broken." 47 Consequently
Congressman Skelton and Congressman Geoff Davis introduced legislation to develop interagency national security professionals through a program modeled after the Joint Officer Qualification system utilized by the Defense department. A method must be devised to tie the budgeting process more intimately with national ends and ways. Finally, America must implement a formal evaluation system which incorporates strategic intelligence in a detailed assessment of our ends, ways, and means.
Recommendations
Recommending feasible improvements to the national strategy process can be a daunting task. Given the complexities of the interagency process, these recommendations will focus on improvements to those areas within the process which would facilitate clearer guidance, focused efforts, improved funding, and better interagency cooperation.
The first recommendation is for Congress to pass additional legislation similar to the Goldwater-Nichols Act requiring a Quadrennial National Strategy Review (QNSR) which identifies long term national ends (15-20 year horizon). This document will complement but be more comprehensive and holistic than the current big three (Defense, Homeland Security, and State) Quadrennial Department Reviews. The QNSR should be a complete "whole of government" strategy, identifying interests which require foreign and/or domestic policies to achieve. Such a review will provide ". . . A comprehensive look at how we can spend our resources most efficiently, how we can achieve our priorities most effectively, what we should be doing differently, and how we should prepare ourselves for the world ahead." 52 This review would allow the president to identify long term national interests, provide broad guidance in pursuance thereof, and assign lead agency responsibilities. Under the QNSR umbrella, the big three Quadrennial Reviews could provide nested, complementary strategies to meet the desired domestic, foreign, and security policy objectives. Without such a document, each of the existing Quadrennial Reviews is essentially a monolithic document with no overarching strategy to coordinate and synchronize efforts. As Kathleen Hicks pointed out, "To be useful, the QDR should be nested within a broader Quadrennial National Security Review conducted under the President's guidance." 53 Since enduring national interests seldom experience sweeping changes, each document would truly be a review of the previously identified ends and any corrections that are needed. The quadrennial requirement would tie the document to each new administration, allowing for slight course corrections caused by the change in government.
Additionally, a Presidential Directive should implement improved strategic planning procedures which complement or even replace the existing NSS. This would require the National Security Council to prepare biannual National Security Planning Guidance (NSPG) for the interagency community. Whereas the NSS outlines broad statements of strategic direction and is designed for public consumption, the NSPG will be classified and include a detailed strategy which connects ends, ways, and means with an emphasis on execution. Whereas the QNSR is focused on enduring ends, the NSPG will be a more dynamic document, identifying needed corrections, reallocating responsibilities, and adjusting to the global situation in light of evolving circumstances.
In effect, the NSPG would be the interagency equivalent to the Guidance for Employment of Forces document. If the QNSR represents the long term national strategy (one to two decades), the NSPG would address the mid-term strategy and look three to five years into the future. Both documents, however, would break the current paradigm of focusing on the "crisis du jour."
Subordinate agencies will utilize the NSPG to develop their individual strategies and budget requests, based upon tasks assigned and resources required. The biannual nature of the guidance will allow for agencies to incorporate key tasks and responsibilities into their budget cycle, justifying the cost based upon the national interests and assigned missions. Utilizing a Presidential Directive would allow the president to maintain control of the process, tailor it to his NSC and personal leadership style, while still providing ownership and accountability at the department level. Too often bureaucratic reorganizations have faltered in the past because they failed to demand the accountability which drives the behavior of individuals and organizations. 54 If a national strategy is to be effective, America must find some way to cooperatively involve the legislative and executive branches. The logical course of action is to tie the budget process to strategy development. Congress must enforce the annual submission of the NSS in conjunction with the president's budget. The executive branch should also make the NSPG and individual agency strategies available as part of the budget approval process. Tying the submission of these strategies to the budget process will provide Congress with the connection between 18 strategy, force structure, and planned activities. Such a procedure could highlight the discrepancies faced by some departments in their assigned tasks and available resources. For instance, even though the United States has recently been involved in significant nation building and development as a result of two wars, the United States Agency for International Development has suffered a 75% reduction in its staffing numbers since the 1970's. 55 By involving Congress in the strategy approval process more intimately, the administration will ensure the resourcing of the agreed upon objectives and a more cohesive application of the DIME.
Care must be taken to prevent the budget from driving strategy. Our current process and interagency organization lacks suitable feedback and assessment mechanisms. If done properly, the NSPG assessment would allow our government to see ourselves and our performance objectively. The president and the NSC could ascertain if our current strategy is effective and could enforce accountability of those tasked with its execution. Congress would be able to determine if funded programs met expectations, needed additional resources, or were simply sunk costs.
The assessment would also require the intelligence community to provide the sorely needed strategic intelligence needed for careful strategy development. This analysis should focus on the future trends, possible developments, and potential wild 20 cards that may impact our national interests. Informed policy makers and planners can then make educated decisions on current and future strategies. By creating a biannual requirement which is offset from the biannual NSPG, the government can conduct a meaningful, informed, recurring national strategy development process. In military terms, the assessment would provide the president and the NSC with a National
Training Center take-home packet that would highlight the changes necessary for the next NSPG.
Conclusion
The American system of checks and balances splits the responsibility for a national strategy between the legislative and the executive branches. The executive branch defines the national ends and is responsible for implementing the ways. The legislative branch provides the means to accomplish these objectives through the budgeting and oversight process. Even within the executive branch, many of these responsibilities are split between the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and increasingly, the Department of Homeland Security. James Schlesinger wrote, "The system of checks and balances, fundamental as it may be to the American democracy, markedly detracts, not only from the unity of command (save in periods of dire national emergency), but even from the possibility of coherent and consistent policy formulation." 56 Divided governmental responsibilities may create inefficiencies, but it is the defining element of our constitutional government. The challenge lies in minimizing these inefficiencies and ensuring unity of effort.
Our current national strategy process does not tie these responsibilities together in a cohesive process that ensures unity of effort and full application of the elements of national power in support of our strategic interests. Even those within our government 21 acknowledge this deficiency. The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development
Review stated that, "We can work smarter and better by setting clear priorities, managing for results, holding ourselves accountable, and unifying our efforts." 57 By implementing the recommended changes to the current process, America will be able to adequately plan, resource, and execute a grand national strategy.
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